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Abstract—Impulse Radio Ultra-Wideband, in particular the
recent standard IEEE 802.15.4a, is a primary candidate for
implementing distance bounding protocols, thanks to its ability
to perform accurate indoor ranging. Distance bounding protocols
allow two wireless devices to securely estimate the distance
between themselves, with the guarantee that the estimate is an
upper-bound on the actual distance. These protocols serve as
building blocks in security-sensitive applications such as tracking,
physical access control, or localization.
We investigate the resilience of IEEE 802.15.4a to physical-
communication-layer attacks that decrease the distance measured
by distance bounding protocols, thus violating their security.
We consider two attack types: malicious prover (internal) and
distance-decreasing relay (external). We show that if the honest
devices use energy-detection receivers (popular due to their low
cost and complexity), then an adversary can perform highly
effective internal and external attacks, decreasing the distance
by hundreds of meters. However, by using more sophisticated
rake receivers, or by implementing small modifications to IEEE
802.15.4a and employing energy-detection receivers with a simple
countermeasure, honest devices can reduce the effectiveness of
external distance-decreasing relay attacks to the order of 10m.
The same is true for malicious prover attacks, provided that an
additional modification to IEEE 802.15.4a is implemented.
Index Terms—Security, ranging, distance bounding, impulse
radio, ultra-wideband.
I. INTRODUCTION
ONE of the distinguishing features of Impulse RadioUltra-Wideband (IR-UWB) is its capability of high pre-
cision indoor ranging, even in dense multi-path environments
[1]. This was also one of the main reasons for including
an IR-UWB physical layer (PHY) in the IEEE 802.15.4a
standard. The ability to measure the distance between two
devices with a precision of less than one meter is an enabler
for many location-aware applications and services, such as
physical access control, tracking of goods and people, or
indoor localization. Many of these applications are security-
sensitive: They require trustworthy distance measurements,
even in the presence of an adversary interfering with the
ranging process.
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Secure range estimation is the domain of distance-bounding
(DB) protocols [2]. They allow a verifier to obtain a secure
upper-bound on the distance to a prover. DB protocols are
cryptographic in nature, which means that they consider an
adversary that manipulates and injects messages on the bit
level. However, DB protocols abstract away from the PHY
details and are therefore susceptible to PHY attacks, in which
an adversary manipulates PHY symbols, rather than bits [3].
Such attacks can bypass any cryptographic mechanisms and
allow a malicious prover or an external adversary mounting a
relay attack to violate DB security by decreasing the measured
distance.
Because of its unique ranging capabilities, IR-UWB is
often mentioned as an ideal candidate for a DB PHY. In
addition, IR-UWB can incorporate very short symbols, which
mitigates PHY attacks [3]. One approach is to design an
IR-UWB DB PHY from scratch. An alternative approach,
which we investigate in this paper, is to use an existing
PHY, such as IEEE 802.15.4a. The latter approach has a
number of advantages. First, PHYs are typically designed
with performance in mind, and a DB protocol would benefit
from the performance optimization provided by such a PHY.
Another important benefit is the ease of deployment on devices
compatible with an established PHY. However, a thorough
evaluation of resilience of the PHY to PHY attacks is crucial:
Often, features improving benign-case performance create
vulnerabilities.
This is exactly the problem we address in this paper: We
adapt the distance-decreasing PHY attacks introduced in [3]
(early detection and late commit) to the IEEE 802.15.4a stan-
dard and evaluate their effectiveness. We extend our previous
work [4] by considering different types of receivers, and
malicious prover attacks (internal) in addition to distance-
decreasing relay attacks (external). We also examine coun-
termeasures that can mitigate PHY attacks, while minimally
degrading the benign-case performance. We make the follow-
ing new contributions:
 We unveil an anomaly in the convolutional code employed
in IEEE 802.15.4a, which can be exploited by an adversary
equipped with a rake receiver that attacks energy-detection
receivers. It allows the adversary to decrease the distance
more substantially than the attacks in [4], or to mount an
undetectable attack with a more modest, but still substantial
distance-decrease. The anomaly can be patched with a small
modification to IEEE 802.15.4a.
We show that time-hopping used in IEEE 802.15.4a allows a
malicious prover to augment the distance-decrease of PHY at-
tacks at the cost of decreasing the probability of attack success.
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A rake-equipped malicious prover can also similarly exploit
the combination of BBPM and BPSK employed in IEEE
802.15.4a. The time-hopping vulnerability can be patched with
a small modification to IEEE 802.15.4a.
 We observe that by increasing the length of nonces used
in a DB protocol, we can improve its performance and
preserve the security level. We use this observation to advocate
a simple, efficient, and standard-compliant countermeasure
to PHY attacks. Employed in an energy-detection receiver,
along with the convolutional code patch, this countermeasure
effectively limits the distance-decrease of distance-decreasing
relay attacks to around 10m. Employed in an energy-detection
receiver or in a rake receiver, along with the convolutional
code and time-hopping patches, it limits the effectiveness of
malicious prover attacks to around 10m.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II we describe
the related work. In Section III we discuss our assumptions
about DB protocols, and describe a general method to balance
performance and security. In Section IV we introduce the IEEE
802.15.4a PHY and the receivers we consider, and explain
implementing DB within IEEE 802.15.4a. We show a range
of PHY attacks in Section V, and evaluate their performance
in Section VI. In Section VII we discuss countermeasures,
before concluding in Section VIII. An extended version of
this paper is available as a technical report [5].
II. RELATED WORK
Distance bounding was first proposed by Brands and Chaum
in [2]. The first proposal tolerating errors in the bit-exchange
was [6]. A number of other DB protocols are proposed,
addressing aspects such as mutual ranging [7], [8], resilience
to the terrorist fraud (see Section III) [9], [10], [11], efficiency
[12], privacy [13], and formal verification [14], [15].
Physical layer attacks against distance bounding were first
introduced in [3]. The effectiveness of these attacks against
concrete PHYs is studied in [16] (ISO 14443 RFID and wire-
less sensor networks) and [4] (IEEE 802.15.4a). Another type
of PHY attacks against IR-UWB ranging was introduced in
[17]. The attack is based on introducing malicious interference
to manipulate the time-of-arrival estimation, thus decreasing
the measured distance.
An IR-UWB architecture for implementing DB protocols is
proposed in [18]. The maximum distance-decrease an adver-
sary can gain against this PHY is 3 − 6m. This is achieved
with the short symbol duration of 20ns, which limits the
applicability of this PHY in dense multi-path environments for
which IEEE 802.15.4a was designed. An ID-based distance
bounding protocol is implemented on proprietary IR radios
in [19]. Beyond IR-UWB, DB PHYs tailored to narrow-band
RFID systems are proposed in [10], [20], [21], and a DB PHY
for smartcards (wire-line) is introduced in [22].
III. DISTANCE BOUNDING
Distance bounding (DB) protocols are cryptographic pro-
tocols that allow one device, the verifier V, to compute an
upper-bound on the distance to another device, the prover
P, in an adversarial setting. Like regular ranging protocols,
DB protocols perform distance estimation based on time-of-
flight measurements of ranging messages: the challenge(s)
sent by V and the response(s) of P . Additional messages are
employed to guarantee authentication. Three threat scenarios
are traditionally considered [23], [9]. In the mafia fraud, the
adversary interferes with a DB session between an honest V
and an honest P , and decreases the measured distance below
the actual distance. In the other scenarios, a malicious P
convinces V that it is closer than it actually is, working alone
(distance fraud), or in collusion with other malicious devices
(terrorist fraud).
A. Security Level and Performance
The challenge and response messages in a DB protocol
(Figure 1) are typically nonces (of length Nnonce each), unpre-
dictable to the adversary. At the end of the protocol execution,
the verifier learns both the true and the received values of
these nonces. The verifier accepts a distance measurement
only if the received challenge and response messages contain
less than Nerr erroneous bits each. The parameters Nnonce, Nerr
jointly determine 1) the maximum bit error rate (BER) that
the protocol tolerates and 2) the security level.
The security level of a DB protocol is defined as the
probability that the adversary will succeed in decreasing the
measured distance below the actual distance. Let us set aside
physical layer attacks, and assume that the DB protocol is
cryptographically secure and that the authenticator is too long
to be guessable. Then, the adversary is limited to guessing
attacks on the nonces: 1) a malicious P guesses the challenge
or response and replies early to V ’s challenge; 2) an external
adversary guesses the response and replies early in place of
the honest P ; 3) an external adversary guesses the challenge,
sends it to P to extract the correct response, and sends this
response to V . The success probability of such guessing
attacks is:
Pguess = FBIN(Nerr|Nnonce, 12) (1)
where FBIN(x|n, p) is the CDF of a binomial distribution with
parameters n and p.
Inverting the CDF yields the maximum Nerr achieving a
desired security level Pguess:
Nerr = F−1BIN(Pguess|Nnonce,
1
2
) (2)
Interestingly, for a fixed security level, this allows a DB
protocol to operate at virtually any bit error rate by simply
increasing Nnonce and Nerr. (We will see in Section VII why
this is an important property for potential countermeasures).
Indeed, we have that:
lim
Nnonce→∞
Nerr = lim
Nnonce→∞
F−1BIN(Pguess|Nnonce, 1/2) = (3)
= lim
Nnonce→∞
F−1N (Pguess|Nnonce/2, Nnonce/4)
where F−1N (x|μ, σ2) is the inverse of the CDF of a normal
distribution with mean μ and variance σ2 and the second
equality follows from the central limit theorem. The protocol
succeeds as long as there are no more than Nerr errors in
a nonce of length Nnonce, resulting in a bit error rate of
BERmax = Nerr/Nnonce. From (3) it then follows that, as the
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Fig. 1. Examples of distance bounding protocol: (a) is secure only
against the mafia fraud, (b) and (c) are secure against the distance fraud
and the mafia fraud. (b) achieves distance fraud resilience with the rapid-
bit-exchange (RBE), (c) replaces RBE with full-duplex transmission. All
protocols are simplified for the sake of clarity, in reality both the Verifier,
V, and Prover, P, need to be aware that they are engaging in a distance
bounding session with each other. V estimates the distance to P with the
formula dV P = c(tRTT − tTA)/2, where c is the channel propagation
speed. MACVP stands for Message Authentication Code with a symmetric
key shared between V and P, NV and NP are freshly generated nonces, tTA
is a constant turn-around time that V and P know, and which is assumed 0
for protocol (b), and tRTT is the round-trip-time measured by V.
length of the nonce increases, the maximum sustainable bit
error rate BERmax tends to the worst case of 1/2, i.e.,
lim
Nnonce→∞
BERmax = (4)
lim
Nnonce→∞
Nnonce/2 +
√
Nnonce/4Φ−1(Pguess)
Nnonce
=
1
2
where Φ−1(x) denotes the inverse CDF of a standard normal
distribution.
B. Choosing the Nonce Length
DB protocols make use of both ranging and communication
packets. We have seen in the preceding section that ranging
packets carrying nonces can support very high bit error rates
and still achieve the desired security level Pguess, provided
that the coding rate is properly adjusted through the param-
eters Nnonce and Nerr. In contrast, communication packets do
not necessarily offer the same flexibility because the coding
rate can be fixed (as in the case of IEEE 802.15.4a, see
Section IV-A3). Consequently, if we define a performance
goal in terms of the maximum tolerable packet error rate for
communication packets of a given length PERcomm, there is
a minimum signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) SNRmin required to
reach this goal. Given PERcomm, SNRmin can be established
analytically or with simulations.
We can define a similar performance goal for ranging
packets by fixing their maximum tolerable packet error rate
PERdb. Now, if ranging and communication ought to have the
same operating range, ranging packets should achieve PERdb
at SNRmin. To guarantee this, we can first establish (again
analytically or with simulations) the bit error rate BERdb that
ranging messages experience at SNRmin. A ranging packet of
length Nnonce subject to BERdb is considered to be in error if
SYNC SFD
0c0 0 0 0 0c1 0 0 0 0cC-1 0 0 0
Tc = 2ns
Nsync Tpsym
Ls
0 S 0 -S 0 0 -SSS S S S S S
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tTHS,i Ncpb
… … … …
Tsym /4Tsym /4
payload
Fig. 2. IEEE 802.15.4a packet structure: preamble and payload.
it contains more than Nerr errors. We can thus derive Nnonce
and Nerr by solving the system of equations formed by (2),
that ensures the desired security level, and
Nerr = F−1BIN(1 − PERdb|Nnonce, BERdb) (5)
that ensures the required PERdb.
IV. IR-UWB SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. IEEE 802.15.4a PHY
IEEE 802.15.4 is a standard for low-rate wireless personal
area networks (WPAN). The IEEE 802.15.4a amendment [24]
defines an IR-UWB PHY that allows for low-rate communi-
cation and high precision ranging. Because of the ultrawide-
band nature of this PHY, the transmitting power is significantly
limited by regulation. This results in a relatively low commu-
nication range (20-30 m). We focus on one of the mandatory
modes of the standard, LPRF (low pulse repetition frequency).
However, our results are easily transferable to other modes
(which use different parameter values). All parameter values
are publicly known.
An IEEE 802.15.4a packet (Figure 2) is composed of a
preamble followed by a payload part.
1) Preamble: The preamble consists of a SYNC part and
the start frame delimiter (SFD). The SYNC part is composed
of Nsync = 64 identical preamble symbols of duration Tpsym =
3968 ns. The SFD is composed of a particular sequence of
Nsfd = 8 preamble symbols. Each preamble symbol is formed
by C code symbols that consist of Ls chips of duration Tc =
2 ns. Pulses are sent in the first chip of every code symbol and
modulated according to a ternary preamble code of length C.
The received signal during reception of a preamble and after
filtering with a bandpass filter of bandwidth B is given by:
rpre(t) =
Nsync+Nsfd∑
i=1
si
C∑
j=1
cj ·h(t−jLsTc−iTpsym−ν0)+w(t) (6)
where h(t) is the unknown channel response (including the
transmitted waveform, the response of the multi-path channel
and the bandpass filter) assumed invariant for the duration
of one packet, w(t) is a zero-mean AWGN process with
power spectral density N0/2, cj ∈ {−1, 0,+1} are the
elements of the preamble code and ν0 is the propagation
delay. Each preamble symbol is modulated by the sequence
si = [1, . . . , 1, 0, 1, 0,−1, 1, 0, 0,−1] whose last eight ele-
ments denote the SFD.
4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION
2) Payload: The payload is modulated using a combination
of Binary Pulse Position Modulation (BPPM) and Binary
Phase-Shift Keying (BPSK). In addition, time-hopping is used
to allow for multiple-access and every symbol is signalled
through the transmission of a burst of Ncpb pulses. The signal
received during the i-th payload symbol is:
ri(t) = w(t)+ (7)
(2ai − 1)
Ncpb∑
j=1
bij · h(t− iTsym − diTsym/2− tTHS,i − jTc − ν0)
where ai is the polarity bit (BPSK), di the position bit
(BPPM), Tsym = 1024ns is the symbol duration, tTHS,i ∈
[0, tmaxTHS], where tmaxTHS = Tsym/4−Ncpb ·Tc, defines the pseudo-
random time-hopping offset, and the scrambling sequence bij
defines the polarity of the j-th pulse of the i-th burst. Both
the time-hopping and the scrambling sequences are derived
from a fixed and publicly known linear feedback shift register
that is initialized to a publicly known state at the beginning
of every packet. Both sequences are thus the same for every
packet.
3) Channel Coding: A systematic rate 1/2 convolutional
code with generator polynomials g1 = (0, 1, 0) and g2 =
(1, 0, 1) is used. Denote the bits to be transmitted by xi.
Then the position bit is di = xi and the polarity bit is
ai = xi−1 ⊕ xi+1, where ⊕ denotes modulo two addition.
With this construction, an energy-detection receiver, which
cannot recover the polarity bit, can still decode the transmitted
bit sequence xi; whereas a coherent receiver, which can
recover both bits, can apply convolutional decoding to improve
performance. IEEE 802.15.4a also applies a systematic (55,63)
Reed-Solomon (RS) code before modulation.
B. Wireless Transceivers
Honest devices are equipped with an IEEE 802.15.4a
compliant receiver and transmitter. The choice of transmitter
is of little consequence to our investigation, any standard-
compliant transmitter is acceptable, e.g., [25], [26]. We con-
sider two types of receivers: a low-complexity and low-cost
non-coherent energy-detection receiver, and a sophisticated
coherent rake receiver.
Adversarial devices are equipped with transmitters similar
to the honest devices, but able to send non-standard-compliant
pulse sequences and to ignore regulatory transmission power
limits. The adversary may further equip his devices with high
gain antennas, thus allowing him to increase the SNR observed
by both adversarial and honest devices. Such an increase
in SNR can also be achieved by the adversary moving his
devices closer to the honest devices. The receivers used by
the adversary are modified versions of the receivers presented
next (see Section V).
1) Energy-Detection Receiver: The energy-detection re-
ceiver (we also use the term energy detector) squares and
integrates the received signal r(t). The integrator outputs a
discrete time sample every T = Tc = 2 ns. Such a sampling
rate is high enough to allow for precise ranging.
The receiver employs a traditional synchronization algo-
rithm based on a correlation with the known preamble se-
quence. After a coarse synchronization, usually achieved on
the strongest multi-path component, the receiver undertakes
a verification phase. If successful, fine synchronization is
performed using a back-search algorithm, to obtain a better
estimate of the beginning of the signal. The receiver then
performs a period of channel estimation where it estimates the
energy-delay profile of the channel by averaging a number of
preamble symbols. At the same time it also begins to look for
the SFD.
To demodulate the i-th BPPM bit di of the payload, the
receiver uses the optimum decision rule from [27], [28],
comparing the (weighted) energies in the first and second half
of the symbol:
M−1∑
m=0
ym,i · pm
di=0
≷
di=1
M−1∑
m=0
y
m+
Tf
2Tc
,i
· pm (8)
where ym,i denotes the m-th discrete sample of the i-th
symbol. The weighting coefficients pm are derived from the
energy-delay profile of the channel. The number of samples
to combine is M = tdet/T , where tdet defines the detection
time: the length of the received signal (per half-symbol) that
the receiver uses to demodulate the bits; tdet is chosen to be
large enough to account for the channel delay spread. In our
simulations we use the non-line-of-sight residential channel
model from [29] and set tdet = 60ns accordingly.
2) Rake Receiver: The receiver with optimal performance
(in a benign setting), but also with the highest complexity, is
an all-rake receiver using maximum ratio combining (MRC)
[30]. The convolutional code is decoded with the optimal
symbol-wise branch metric for BPPM/BPSK given in [31]. For
this paper, the crucial difference between an energy-detection
receiver and a rake receiver is that the latter can recover the
polarity bits ai during payload demodulation. This diminishes
the effectiveness of payload PHY attacks against rake receivers
(Section V-C), but also opens a new space for payload attacks
if a rake receiver is used against energy-detection receivers.
In our analysis of the rake receiver, we therefore focus on
the payload, assuming perfect synchronization and channel
estimation.
Similar to the energy-detection receiver, an important pa-
rameter for our analysis is the detection time tdet, denoting
the portion of the received signal that the rake receiver uses
to demodulate a bit. We chose tdet large enough to account
for the channel delay spread.
C. Distance Bounding with IEEE 802.15.4a
DB protocols that are secure only against the mafia fraud,
such as the protocol in Figure 1(a), are directly compatible
with IEEE 802.15.4a. This is because they employ a stan-
dard packet format for ranging messages [7], [14]. However,
protocols that are also secure against the distance fraud or
the terrorist fraud are typically not directly compatible with
IEEE 802.15.4a. Such protocols need to prevent a malicious
prover from decreasing the measured distance by responding
prematurely. This is traditionally achieved with a rapid bit
exchange (RBE), in which V sends single bit challenges, to
which the prover should respond instantly (Figure 1(b)). An
IEEE 802.15.4a implementation of the RBE – which requires
prefixing every bit with a lengthy preamble – is not only
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inefficient, but also opens a space for packet-level attacks [3].
Nevertheless, recent proposals [13] show that with full duplex
transmission, regular packet formats can be used in place
of the rapid-bit-exchange. Applying this principle in IEEE
802.15.4a requires adding a number of “buffer” bits at the
beginning of the challenge’s payload, of total duration equal
to the duration of the preamble (Figure 1(c)). This is necessary
because the prover cannot start sending the response preamble
before it synchronizes and detects the SFD of the challenge
preamble, whereas security requires that every response sym-
bol is transmitted instantly after the corresponding challenge
symbol.
We define tres as the time interval at the prover between
the start of the reception of a challenge bit and the start of
the transmission of the corresponding response bit. To make
the response as “instant” as possible with IEEE 802.15.4a, we
assume that tres = Tsym/2+tmaxTHS+tdet. This is the smallest tres
sufficient to demodulate symbols with maximal time-hopping
offsets.
We assume that the DB protocol has access to the received
bit sequence before it is decoded with the error correcting
codes (Reed-Solomon, convolutional). In a receiver implemen-
tation, this assumption can easily be met as these bits have to
be received from the channel in any case. If this assumption is
violated, the success probability of guessing attacks increases,
because coding can mask some of the erroneously guessed
bits.
V. DISTANCE-DECREASING ATTACKS
Physical layer (PHY) attacks were first introduced as a
potential attack vector against distance bounding (DB) in [3].
These attacks rely on two primitives: 1) In early detection
(ED), an adversarial receiver (ARX) detects a PHY symbol
(e.g., payload symbol) of duration tsym based only on the
beginning part of this symbol of duration tED < tsym, where
tED is the ED delay. This leads to a detection which is less
reliable, but also faster than that of a normal receiver (which
takes tres > tED of the PHY symbol into account for detection).
2) In late commit (LC), only the (tsym − tLC)-long end-part of
the PHY symbol is modulated based on the intended value of
the symbol (e.g., whether it encodes a 0 bit or a 1 bit), and the
beginning part is modulated independently of this value. This
allows an adversarial transmitter (ATX) to delay the decision
about which symbol it transmits by tLC, where tLC is the
LC delay. The PHY symbols generated with LC typically
differ from regular symbols, but, if appropriately chosen, they
can be demodulated by an honest receiver, albeit with some
performance loss.
The first type of PHY attack we consider is an internal
attack mounted by a malicious prover (consisting of an ARX
and an ATX), which can be used in a distance/terrorist fraud.
In this attack, a malicious prover uses ED, LC or their com-
bination to respond prematurely to the verifier’s V challenge.
This decreases the propagation time measured by V by an
offset tgain that we call the time-gain. The time-gain is equal
to (tC + tres− tED)/2 for an ED-only attack, (tLC + tres− tD)/2
for an LC-only attack, and (tLC + tres − tED)/2 for an ED+LC
attack, where tD and tC are, respectively, the detection delay
HTX
timeHRX trelay
ARX
ATX
preamble payload
preamble payload
preamble payload
preamble payload
trelay
IEEE 802.15.4a
channel
IEEE 802.15.4a
channel
adversarial
channel
Fig. 3. Overview of the distance-decreasing relay attack. ARX and ATX are
assumed to be located on a line between HRX and HTX. The thick dotted
arrow indicates time-of-arrival corresponding to the actual distance between
HTX and HRX.
and commit delay when the attacker chooses not to perform
ED and LC. (Note: it is possible that tD < tres and tC > 0
if time-hopping is involved.) The time-gain translates into a
distance-decrease of c · tgain, where c is the speed of light.
The second type of attack we consider is a distance-
decreasing relay attack between two honest devices. This
attack is mounted by an external adversary using a combi-
nation of ED and LC and it can be classified as a mafia
fraud. The general setup for the relay attack is shown in
Figure 3. The adversary should mount the distance-decreasing
relay attack on all ranging messages (challenge, response);
other messages, being not time-critical, can be relayed in
an arbitrary fashion. Without loss of generality, we focus on
the exchange of a single ranging message. In this case one
of the honest devices acts as a transmitter (HTX) and the
other one as a receiver (HRX), whereas one adversarial device
acts as an early detection receiver (ARX), and another as a
late commit transmitter (ATX). The channel from HTX to
ARX, and from ATX to HRX is the IEEE 802.15.4a channel.
ARX and ATX communicate using a dedicated, out-of-band
adversarial channel. The propagation speed of both channels
is c, the speed of light.
In a distance-decreasing relay attack the adversary relays
messages between HTX and HRX in such a way that to
HRX they seem “shifted back in time” by a positive offset
trelay = tLC − tED that we call the relay time-gain (Figure 3).
The distance measured by V is then reduced by the relay
distance-decrease c · trelay. (Assuming that ARX and ATX are
located on a line between HTX and HRX. In other configu-
rations the distance decrease will be smaller. Note, however,
that the choice of the configuration rests with the adversary.)
In the relay attack, ATX needs to begin the transmission of
the preamble at time t0− trelay, before ARX begins receiving
the preamble from HTX a time t0. However, the adversary
learns t0 only after synchronizing to the preamble of HTX.
(Guessing t0 is not practical at the nanosecond precision
required.) To escape this vicious circle, the adversary needs to
mount some form of ED and LC on the preamble, in addition
to ED and LC on the payload. In contrast, the preamble attacks
are not necessary in the case of malicious prover attacks.
Note that the distance-decrease that the adversary might
wish to obtain is not limited by the low communication range
of IEEE 802.15.4a. Indeed, a malicious prover can increase
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Fig. 4. Distance-decreasing relay attack on the preamble.
his communication range by using a high gain antenna and
transmitting with non-regulatory power to reach a remote
prover. Further, in a relay attack, the adversary can “connect”
remote HRX and HTX by placing ARX close to HTX and
ATX close to HRX, and using a long-range ATX–ARX link
to which the range limitations of IEEE 802.15.4a do not apply.
We consider three scenarios, in which the adversary uses
different types of receivers against different types of receivers
used by the honest devices: Energy Detector against Energy
Detector, Rake against Energy Detector, and Rake against
Rake. For each scenario we first analyze the delay of the
ED and LC primitives. Then, we elaborate on the use of
these primitives for malicious prover attacks and relay attacks.
Table I summarizes the upper-bounds on the time-gain and
distance-decrease of various variants of PHY attacks. Note that
the preamble attack is only presented in Section V-A1, as this
attack is applicable and sufficient in the two other scenarios
(it can achieve the relay time-gains of the magnitude required
for the payload attack).
A. Energy Detector against Energy Detector
1) Attack on the Preamble: The attack, which is part of the
distance-decreasing relay attack, is depicted in Figure 4; for
clarity of presentation, we assume the distance between ARX
and ATX to be 0. ARX performs packet detection, timing
acquisition, and channel estimation in the same fashion as
an honest receiver. ARX then signals the fact that it has
acquired timing to ATX. Deviating from honest receivers,
ARX performs early SFD detection: It chooses an early SFD
detection delay tSFDED and tries to detect the presence of the
SFD by deliberately considering only the first tSFDED ns of
every received preamble symbol. As the SFD starts with a
0 modulated preamble symbol, as opposed to a 1 modulated
symbol used during the SYNC part, early SFD detection boils
down to on-off keying (OOK) demodulation.
At the other end of the relay, ATX chooses a late SFD
commit delay tSFDLC and remains silent until ARX signals that
timing acquisition has been successful. Then, after an appro-
priately chosen (we explain how shortly) delay τ < Tpsym,
ATX begins transmitting a sequence of preamble symbols S.
This is repeated until ARX signals that the SFD was detected.
Immediately afterwards, ATX switches to the transmission of
a standard compliant SFD, beginning from tSFDLC into the SFD.
This concludes the distance-decreasing attack on the preamble.
In contrast to a standard-compliant preamble, the SYNC
part of the preamble generated by ATX begins with a number
of 0 modulated preamble symbols; The beginning of the SFD
tTHS time
ARX
ATX
tDET=tED
tED
tDET tDET
tTHS
tTHS tTHStTHS
?
tTHS tTHS tTHS
tDET
tED tED
tLC tLC tLC tLC
di = 1 di+1 = 0 di+2 = 0 di+3 = 1
tTHS
symbol i symbol i+1 symbol i+2 symbol i+3
2·tgain
tres
Fig. 5. Example of a malicious prover ED+LC attack on the payload. The
first two symbols use equal time-hopping offsets for corresponding symbols,
hence their time-gain is identical. The maximal time-gain for the 3rd symbol
is larger than the packet-wide time-gain chosen of the adversary. The time-
gain for the 4th symbol is smaller than the packet-wide time-gain, and the
adversary is forced to guess.
corresponds to a 1 modulated preamble symbol for a duration
of tSFDLC , instead of having no signal contribution. The relay
time-gain achieved by this attack is trelay = tSFDLC − tSFDED . This
determines the choice of τ , as Tpsym − τ = trelay mod Tpsym.
2) Attack on the Payload: Payload attacks are performed
on a symbol basis. As we are considering energy-detection
receivers, which are blind to the signal polarity, only the
position bit di is relevant.
a) ED: ARX performs ED by deciding on the value of
dRXi after an early detection delay tED(dRXi ) = tRXTHS,i + tAdet <
Tsym/2, where tAdet denotes the detection time of ARX and tRXTHS
is the time-hopping offset sequence of the received message.
This implies that ARX replaces BPPM demodulation with
on-off keying (OOK) demodulation. The time tAdet can be
made arbitrarily short, it determines the attack’s performance.
If ARX chooses not to perform ED, the detection delay is
tD(dRXi ) = Tsym/2 + t
RX
THS,i + tdet.
b) LC: In the LC attack, ATX always transmits a burst
of pulses with energy E0 (shifted by the appropriate time-
hopping offset). In the second half of the symbol, ATX acts
according to the value of dTXj : If dTXj = 0, ATX transmits
nothing in the second part of the symbol; if dTXj = 1, ATX
transmits a burst of pulses with energy E1 > E0. This
attack exploits the fact that HRX performs a simple energy
comparison to demodulate. The late commit delay for dTXj
is tLC(dTXj ) = Tsym/2 + tTXTHS,j + tPLC, where tTXTHS is the
time-hopping offset sequence of the transmitted message, and
tPLC < tdet is the pulse LC delay, by which the transmission
of the pulse can be additionally delayed, similar to the LC
attacks discussed in [3], [16]. Throughout most of the paper,
notably Section VI, we assume tPLC = 0. If ATX chooses to
send standard-compliant symbols, it can still delay committing
to the transmitted symbol by tC(dTXj ) = tTXTHS,j .
c) Malicious Prover: The time-gain of the ED-only ma-
licious prover attack for corresponding challenge and response
symbols i and j is tgain(i, j) = (tC(dTXj )+tres−tED(dRXi ))/2 =
(Tsym/2 + tmaxTHS + tdet − tAdet)/2 + (tTXTHS,j − tRXTHS,i)/2 = C +
(tTXTHS,j − tRXTHS,i)/2, where C is a constant not dependent on i
and j. The time-gain of other malicious prover attacks can also
be expressed as C +(tTXTHS,j− tRXTHS,i)/2. The latter term varies
from −tmaxTHS/2 to tmaxTHS/2, because tTXTHS = tRXTHS if different
channels are used for for RX and TX, but also because i = j
due to the “buffer” bits (Figure 1(c)). However, the structure
of the attack demands that the adversary chooses a constant
time-gain tgain for all symbols. This leaves the adversary
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with a strategic decision: The adversary can set the time-gain
conservatively, to make sure there is enough time to perform
ED and/or LC on every symbol (i.e., choose tgain ≤ tgain(i, j)
for all corresponding i, j index pairs). Alternatively, the ad-
versary can set the time-gain more aggressively, which will
force him to guess the bits with unfavorable time-hopping
offsets (i.e., i, j pairs for which tgain(i, j) < tgain). This is
illustrated in Figure 5. In this way, the adversary can trade-off
a larger time-gain (up to 2 · tmaxTHS/2) for a lower attack success
probability. Figure 6 shows this trade-off for one particular
case (Nnonce = 42, Nerr = 2, mandatory LPRF mode).
d) Relay: For the relay attack, the time-gain is
trelay(i, j) = tLC(dTXj ) − tED(dRXi ) = Tsym/2 + tPLC +
tTXTHS,j − tRXTHS,i − tAdet. However, in the case of the relay
attack tRXTHS = tTXTHS and i = j. Hence, the time gain is
trelay = Tsym/2 + tPLC − tAdet for every symbol. This is also
the upper-bound on the overall time-gain of the relay attack,
as the time-gains achievable for the preamble are larger.
B. Rake against Energy Detector
1) ED and LC: If honest devices use energy detectors,
using a rake receiver allows the adversary to perform an
ED attack with negative delay tED by extracting dRXi from
the (i-1)-th symbol. This attack exploits the structure of the
convolutional code: The (i-1)-th payload symbol carries the
position bit dRXi−1 and the polarity bit aRXi−1 = dRXi−2⊕dRXi . With
a rake receiver, ARX can decode both bits, and obtain dRXi by
computing aRXi−1⊕dRXi−2. This is all that is necessary to transmit
the corresponding j-th symbol: The adversary can compute
dTXj from dRXi , and aTXj can be set arbitrarily, as polarity bits
cannot be demodulated by an energy-detection receiver. The
delay of the rake ED attack extracting di from the (i-1)-th sym-
bol is tED(dRXi ) = −(1−dRXi−1)·Tsym/2−Tsym/2+tRXTHS,i−1+tAdet.
HRX is an energy-detector as in Section V-A2, hence the same
LC attack applies.
2) Malicious Prover and Relay: With the rake ED attack,
the malicious prover attacks, but also the relay attack (as i =
j − 1 in this case) are subject to per-symbol variability of the
time-gain due to time-hopping offsets. An additional time-
gain variability is due to BPPM, i.e., the term “−(1− dRXi−1) ·
Tsym/2” of the ED delay. As in Section V-A2, this presents
the adversary with a trade-off between the distance-decrease,
and the probability of a successful attack. For example, the
additional time-gain of the relay attack is at most Tsym/2+2 ·
tmaxTHS, and Figure 6 shows the trade-off for a particular set of
parameters. See Table I for the malicious prover attack.
Furthermore, a negative ED delay allows for an ED-only
distance-decreasing relay attack to be mounted. Although it
has a lower time-gain than an ED+LC relay attack, the ED-
only attack circumvents any countermeasures that prevent LC
attacks, e.g., the countermeasure advocated in Section VII.
C. Rake against Rake
To mitigate the effects of the rake ED attack, an honest
rake receiver must demodulate and check the correctness of
both positions bits di and polarity bits ai (without applying
convolutional decoding, see assumption in Section IV-C). With
this precaution in place, ATX cannot transmit symbol j (with
or without LC) without knowing aTXj .
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Fig. 6. Example trade-off between guessing probability and additional time-
gain achievable with 1) Malicious prover attacks in the scenario “Energy
Detector against Energy Detector” 2) Distance-decreasing relay attack in
the scenario “Rake against Energy Detector”. The guessing probability
Pguess(t
+
gain) = FBIN(Nerr|B(Nnonce, t+gain), 12 ), where B(Nnonce, t+gain) is
the number of bits out of Nnonce that the adversary must guess to obtain
an additional time-gain t+gain . The timing parameter values (notably the
time-hopping sequence) correspond to the mandatory LPRF mode of IEEE
802.15.4a, and Nnonce = 42, Nerr = 2 (corresponds to security level 2−32)
1) ED and LC: The ED delay of demodulating the polarity
bit aRXi is tED(aRXi ) = dRXi ·Tsym/2+tRXTHS,i+tAdet. The LC delay
of committing to aTXj is tLC(aTXj ) = tTXTHS,j+dTXj ·Tsym/2+tPLC.
Note that both delays depend on the value of the position bit d.
The delays for ED of dRXi and LC of dTXj are as in Section V-B.
2) Malicious Prover and Relay: The time-gain is computed
as the minimum of the time-gain for the position bits d and
the time-gain for the polarity bits a. In the relay attack, i = j,
dRX = dTX, aRX = aTX, and tRXTHS = tTXTHS, hence the relay
time-gain is trelay = tPLC − tAdet < tdet, which translates to at
most 10m assuming tdet = 32ns (see Section VI-B). This is
an order of magnitude lower than the attacks presented so far.
The time-gain of malicious prover attacks, without guessing,
is of the same order of magnitude, see Table I. However, a
malicious prover (but not a relaying adversary) can increase
the distance-decrease by as much as Tsym/2+tmaxTHS, by lowering
the probability of success.
Furthermore, in the case of the relay attack, if only one of
the honest devices uses an energy-detection receiver, notably
without any countermeasures deployed, (and even though the
other one uses a rake receiver) the adversary can achieve
a significant time-gain. Even assuming that the distance-
decrease against the rake receiver is negligible, the overall
distance-decrease of the relay attack is c ·tEn.D.relay/2, where tEn.D.relay
is the time-gain of the attack against an energy detector.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the effectiveness of the distance-decreasing
attacks with packet-based system simulations. We simulate
a full IEEE 802.15.4a system including all the operations
necessary to receive a packet: timing acquisition, estimation
of the channel energy-delay profile, SFD detection, and data
decoding. The physical layer is simulated with an accuracy of
100 ps. We use the residential non-line-of-sight channel model
[29] with a channel delay spread Tspread ≈ 60 ns. The signal
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TABLE I
Upper-bound on (relay) time-gain and (relay) distance-decrease of various PHY attacks in various “adversarial receiver against honest receiver”
configurations. The left column presents conservative attacks, that work with 100% success probability. The right column presents the maximal additional
time-gain/distance-decrease that can be achieved by combining PHY attacks and guessing attacks (when time guessing probability approaches the guessing
probability of pure guessing attacks). Time-gain is expressed in terms of Tsym – payload symbol duration, tED = 48-60ns – detection time of honest
receivers without ED-countermeasure, tAdet – detection time of the adversary, tPLC < tdet – pulse LC delay, tmaxTHS – maximum time-hopping offset,
tCdet = 48-60ns – detection time of honest receiver with ED-countermeasure, tCPLC < tCdet – pulse LC delay if countermeasure is deployed. The
corresponding distance-decrease is shown for the IEEE 802.15.4a mandatory modes and delay values that maximize the distance-decrease.
No guessing Max. guessing gain
(relay) time-gain distance-decrease (relay) time-gain distance-decrease
En.D. against En.D.
Malicious Prover ED-only Tsym/4 + (tdet − tAdet)/2 86m + tmaxTHS + 74m
LC-only Tsym/4 + tPLC/2 86m + tmaxTHS + 74m
ED+LC Tsym/2 + (tPLC + tdet − tAdet)/2 171m + tmaxTHS + 74m
Relay Attack ED+LC Tsym/2 + tPLC − tAdet 171m + 0 + 0m
Rake against En.D.
Malicious Prover ED-only Tsym/2 + (tdet − tAdet)/2 162m + Tsym/4 + tmaxTHS + 151m
ED+LC 3/4 · Tsym + (tPLC + tdet − tAdet)/2 248m + Tsym/4 + tmaxTHS + 151m
Relay Attack ED+LC Tsym − tmaxTHS + tPLC − tAdet 251m + Tsym/2 + 2 · tmaxTHS + 302m
ED-only Tsym/2− tmaxTHS − tAdet 79m + Tsym/2 + 2 · tmaxTHS + 302m
Rake against Rake
Malicious Prover ED-only (tdet − tAdet)/2 5m + Tsym/4 + tmaxTHS + 151m
LC-only tPLC/2 5m + Tsym/4 + tmaxTHS + 151m
ED+LC (tdet + tPLC − tAdet)/2 10m + Tsym/2 + tmaxTHS + 228m
Relay Attack ED+LC tPLC − tAdet 10m + 0 + 0m
En.D./Rake against En.D./Rake with ED-countermeasure (Section VII-3) and convolutional code patch
Malicious Prover ED-only (tCdet − tAdet)/2 5-6m + tmaxTHS + 74m
LC-only tCPLC/2 5-6m + t
max
THS + 74m
ED+LC (tCPLC + t
C
det − tAdet)/2 10-12m + tmaxTHS + 74m
Relay Attack ED+LC tPLC − tAdet 10-12m + 0 + 0m
En.D./Rake against En.D./Rake with ED-countermeasure and convolutional code and time-hopping patches
Malicious Prover ED-only (tCdet − tAdet)/2 5-6m + 0 + 0m
LC-only tCPLC/2 5-6m + 0 + 0m
ED+LC (tCPLC + t
C
det − tAdet)/2 10-12m + 0 + 0m
Relay Attack ED+LC tPLC − tAdet 10-12m + 0 + 0m
to noise ratio (SNR) is defined as SNR = EpN0 where Ep is
the received energy per pulse (after the convolution of the
pulse with the impulse response of the channel). We assume
a desired security level of Pguess = 2−32, and performance
goals PERcomm = PERdb = 10−2. According to Section III-B,
this results in ranging packets of length Nnonce = 42 with a
maximum of Nerr = 2 tolerable bit errors.
A. Energy Detector against Energy Detector
For the energy detector against energy detector setting, a
detailed performance evaluation of the ED and LC compo-
nents, as well as of their combination in the case of the
relay attack, was already presented in our previous paper [4]
as well as in [32]. For a detailed discussion of the results,
as well as alternative energy-detection receivers (which show
similar performance), we therefore refer the reader there. In
the following we give a summary of our main findings:
 In all attack scenarios, an adversary can decrease the
distance by an amount that is close to the upper-bounds given
in Table I. Furthermore, it can do so with an impressive
success rate of 99% and at a cost of just a few dB in SNR
with respect to normal system operation. A further increase in
SNR allows the adversary to make the success rate arbitrarily
large.
 For example, to mount an ED attack on the payload,
achieving a distance-decrease of 77 m (tdet = tAdet in the order
of the channel delay spread) with a success rate of 99%, the
adversary requires an SNR at ARX that is 1.6 dB higher
than in benign-case operation. A LC attack on the payload
achieving the same distance-decrease (i.e., tPLC = 0) costs
4 dB in SNR.
 A relay attack, including attacks on both preamble and
payload, and achieving a distance-decrease of 144 m (tPLC =
0, tAdet = 32 ns), requires 6 dB higher SNR at ARX and 4 dB
higher SNR at HRX, compared to benign-case operation.
B. Rake against Energy Detector
We evaluate the rake ED attack for an optimal all-rake
receiver with perfect synchronization and channel estimation.
Figure 7 shows the PER for an adversary performing the ED
attack. When mounting the ED attack, ARX has the option to
ignore (“No Coding”) or take advantage of the convolutional
code (“Coding”). For reference, the performance of a benign
energy-detection receiver and a benign rake receiver are shown
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Fig. 7. Performance of early detection attack on the payload if the adversary
uses an rake receiver. Early detection can be performed by decoding the
convolutional code using partial information (“Coding”) or by neglecting the
convolutional code completely (“No Coding”).
as well. The benign rake receiver decodes the convolutional
code at the end of the packet as in [31], when the full
decoding trellis is available. With ED and taking the code into
account, only a partial trellis containing information about the
symbols received so far is available at the time of decoding.
This contributes to the higher cost (in terms of required
SNR) of the attack with respect to the benign rake receiver
operation. Ignoring the convolutional code is simpler and less
computationally expensive, but results in an additional 3.5dB
increase of the attack cost.
The adversary also has the choice of tAdet. Optimal perfor-
mance is experienced for tAdet = 64ns, in the order of channel
spread. tAdet = 48ns results in a very minor performance loss,
tAdet = 32ns results in noticeable performance loss (around
1− 2dB). Assuming tAdet = 48ns, the attack costs 2.8dB (at a
PER of 10−2, corresponding to an attack with a success rate
of 99%) if coding is taken into account and the relay attack
achieves a time-gain of trelay = 728ns (distance-decrease of
218 meters). At the same cost, the alternative, ED-only attack
achieves a time-gain of tED-onlyrelay = 216ns (distance-decrease of
65 meters).
VII. COUNTERMEASURES
When investigating countermeasures and patches, we con-
sider their effectiveness (the maximum relay time-gain the
adversary can achieve with the countermeasure in place),
the effects they have on benign-case performance, and their
compatibility with IEEE 802.15.4a. We discuss here the coun-
termeasures which, in our opinion, provide the best trade-off
between these factors.
1) Convolutional Code Patch: The rake ED attack is pos-
sible due to the specific combination of BPPM/BPSK with
the convolutional code that IEEE 802.15.4a uses. The attack
can be avoided with a different convolutional code, for which
the polarity bit ai does not reveal information about future
position bits dj , where j > i. The code should not allow
for decoding ai+1 from the i-th symbol i, as this would
enable an effective LC attack against a rake receiver. We
refer to this solution as the convolutional code patch. Alterna-
tively, the convolutional code can be removed altogether. The
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Fig. 8. Cost of Section VII-3 countermeasure when the energy-detection
receiver decides on the bit value using OOK demodulation at time tCdet.
former is not compatible with IEEE 802.15.4a, whereas the
latter is compatible to a very limited extent: Although IEEE
802.15.4a provides a few optional modes that do not use the
convolutional code, these modes cannot be used with energy-
detection receivers, because, for these modes, polarity carries
data information.
2) Time-Hopping Patch: Time-hopping allows a malicious
prover to trade-off attack success probability for additional
time-gain. A simple way to remove this vulnerability is to
modify the time-hopping sequence such that the corresponding
challenge and response symbols have identical time-hopping
offsets. Removing time-hopping is also a solution, but an
inferior one, as it significantly degrades IEEE 802.15.4a multi-
user access properties.
3) Early Detection at Honest Receiver: The honest energy-
detection receiver can choose to only take into account the
beginning of the symbol [16], essentially performing early
detection with OOK demodulation at an offset tCdet from the
beginning of the symbol. Then, tLC is reduced from Tsym/2 to
tCPLC < t
C
det, and the (malicious prover) time-gain due to ED
is limited to (tCdet − tAdet)/2 (assuming that the Prover sends
the response symbol immediately after the early detection
is done). This countermeasure does not induce inter-symbol
interference and is compliant with the mandatory modes of
the standard.
Moreover, the mild performance loss that this countermea-
sure entails due to the ignoring of half of the symbol, can
be compensated for by increasing the length of the nonces
Nnonce. We can derive the required nonce length by using
the method introduced in Section III-B. Figure 8 plots the
resultant Nnonce as a function of tCdet for performance goals
PERcomm = PERdb = 10−2 and 3 security levels. For example,
by employing the countermeasure with tCdet = 40ns and
increasing the number of bits per nonce from 42 to 108 we
can bring the maximum theoretically achievable time-gain to
40ns (distance decrease of about 12 m) maintaining security
level Pguess = 2−32. At the same time, this countermeasure
does not reduce the performance in terms of PER and we
also keep the same security level against guessing attacks.
The only drawback is generating, sending and receiving of
the additional bits required for the longer nonces. As every
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IEEE 802.15.4a payload carrying a nonce is preceded by a
preamble of considerable length, and as a good deal of receiver
complexity during reception stems from synchronization, we
argue that the cost of adding a few bits to the payload is in
most cases acceptable.
Furthermore, this countermeasure can be employed by both
energy-detection and rake receivers to prevent the adversary
from exploiting the BPPM variability (Section V-B). See
Table I for upper-bounds on the attack time-gains with the
countermeasure and patches deployed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the vulnerability of the IEEE
802.15.4a standard to physical layer distance-decreasing at-
tacks. We have demonstrated that if honest devices use energy-
detection receivers without appropriate countermeasures, an
adversary can decrease the measured distance by hundreds of
meters, with a success rate arbitrarily close to 100%. However,
minor modifications to IEEE 802.15.4a and implementing a
simple countermeasure on energy-detection receivers used by
honest devices, allow honest devices to reduce the effective-
ness of distance-decreasing relay attacks to at most 10m. Alter-
natively, this can be achieved (even without IEEE 802.15.4a
modifications) if honest devices use the more sophisticated
rake receivers. Furthermore, to reduce the effectiveness of
malicious prover attacks to around 10m, the honest receivers
(energy detector and rake alike) should implement the same
simple countermeasure, and a time-hopping patch should be
applied to IEEE 802.15.4a. In conclusion, with appropriate
countermeasures on the receivers and patches to the IEEE
802.15.4a standard, the standard can be used as a DB PHY.
More generally, our investigation has identified PHY fea-
tures that, although improving system performance in the
benign case, can create vulnerabilities against distance-
decreasing PHY attacks if used carelessly. One such potential
point of failure is the interaction between the modulation
and the coding scheme. Another, perhaps more fundamental
one, is payload time-hopping, which allows the adversary to
additionally decrease the distance by lowering the attack’s
probability of success. Such features should be approached
with caution, or not used at all, in any DB PHY.
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